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lomas Mcintrye Cooley (1824-1898), one of
three charter faculty members when the University
of Michigan launched its law department in 1859,
was the only one of the three to move to Ann Arbor.
He was elected secretary of the faculty and quickly
became de facto dean through his work as liaison
with the Board of Regents and other parts of the
University. Over the next three decades, his teaching,
writing, judicial terms, and other public work made
him one of the best known and most respected
lawyers in the United States.
Cooley's death in 1898 nearly coincided with the
passing of his century and its agrarian tradition.
Now, on the brink of another century and its
changes, Paul D. Carrington, Harry Chadwick
Professor and former dean at Duke University Law
School, celebrates Cooley and his philosophical
descendants in Stewards of Democracy: Law as a
Public Profession.
Carrington, who taught at the University of
Michigan Law School from 1965-78 and served on
the Ann Arbor school board from 1970-73, started
out to write a biography of Cooley. He concluded by
tracing Cooley's career as a symbol of one strain in
modern American approaches to the law. He writes:
"As a judge and legal scholar, Cooley regarded
the Republic as a client whose instructions, given in
the form of legislation enacted by elected
representatives, ought be obeyed as best they could
be understood even if ill-advised, unless they were in
conflict with express constitutional protections of
private or group interests interpreted to conform to
the common understanding of their meanings. In
short, he strove to facilitate constitutional selfgovernment even if that might require him to
perpetuate policies with which he disagreed."
The following excerpt from Stewards of
Democracy: Law as a Public Profession, by Paul D.
Carrington, © 1999 Westview Press, appears with
the permission of the publisher.

Harvard celebrated its 250th
anniversary in November 1886. It was
therefore a time for self-praise in
Cambridge. Among the events fitting the
occasion was the award of an honorary
doctorate to Thomas McIntyre Cooley of
Ann Arbor, Michigan. Cooley was then the
most respected lawyer in America and was
among the most widely respected persons
in American public life. Indeed, given that
John Marshall had many critics, Cooley
was perhaps the nineteenth-century
American lawyer most esteemed by his
contemporaries. Nothing could have been
more appropriate than that he would be
invited to honor Harvard with a ceremonial
utterance.
Cooley had two years earlier retired
from a quarter-century of service as the
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founding dean, esteemed teacher, and
intellectual leader of a university law
school in Ann Arbor that had for a time far
surpassed Harvard in its ability to attract
students. His former students were so
active in public life that they might also
have surpassed Harvard's alumni in their
service to the Republic.
In addition to his role as an educator,
Cooley in 1865 had been elected to the
Supreme Court of Michigan and had
served that court for twenty years, many of
them as Chief Justice, often as the courts
intellectual leader. His court had been
regarded in the 1870s as possibly the ablest
appellate court in America. Its decisions
were closely read even in Boston. Many
lawyers had favored, and some had sought,
his appointment to the Supreme Court of
the United States; on one occasion, a
leading legal publication, the Central Law
Journal of St. Louis, spoke of his qualifications
for the court as "transcendent." The
appointment was withheld, apparently
because he was viewed by the barons of his
Republican party as too independent. In
1885 his judicial career had come to an
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end when he was defeated for re-election
in a tide of Democratic votes.
Despite the distinction of his teaching
and judicial careers, it was Cooleys
professional legal writing that had won him
the greatest fame. In 1868, he had
published his Constitutional Limitations, a
work recounting and comparing the
interpretations of the constitutions of the
states and of those few provisions of the
antebellum federal constitution applicable
to state government. That work was still, in
1886, the most scholarly and most widely '
used American law book; it was then in its
fifth edition. It was said that no other work
had "been cited more freely or with a
greater measure of commendation"; one

reviewer may have expressed the prevailing
opinion when he went so far as to say that
it is impossible to exaggerate its merits. It is
an ideal treatise, and not only a standard
authority, but almost exclusively sovereign
in its sphere. It is cited in every argument
and opinion on the subjects of which it
treats, and not only is the book
authoritative as a digest of the law, but its
authors opinions are regarded as almost
conclusive.

Charter f acuity member Thomas M. Cooley
in 1861 as a lecturer in constitutional law, two
years after the University of Michigan opened its
law department.

Cooley had also published, in 1873, a
new edition of Joseph Storys Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States,
adding to that dated but popular work an
account of then-recent post-war
amendments imposing new restraints on
the powers of state governments. In 1876,
he had published a useful treatise on
taxation which, like its predecessors,
analyzed judicial interpretations of
constitutional provisions. He had
published yet another treatise in 1879, on
torts, a field then emerging from the
interstices of common law pleading, a
work in which he aptly described the role
of an American common law court. And in
1880, he had published a short text, The
General Principles of Constitutional Law,
which by 1886 was required reading at the
Harvard Law School for students enrolled
in James Bradley Thayers course in
constitutional law. While several of these
works would be the object of later editions
prepared by other hands, when he came to
Cambridge Cooley had ceased his
endeavors as a legal writer.
Although after 1886 Cooley would no
longer judge, teach, or (with one
exception) write law, his career as a lawyer
was not at an end. He remained in demand
as a speaker and as an author of articles in
popular periodicals on public issues of the
day having legal dimensions. He served as
a neutral in the resolution of several
disputes involving the railroad industry,
then America's largest and most complex
business. When the Interstate Commerce
Act was approved in 1887, there was great
concern over the selection of the
commissioners to exercise the modest
power over railroads conferred on the new
Interstate Commerce Commission. The
aged Cooley had no interest in the
appointment, but was importuned by
President Cleveland to chair the
Commission. Cleveland believed him to be
perhaps the one person in America
sufficiently disinterested to be trusted on
all sides to give the embattled Commission
a chance of useful service. Illness forced
Cooley to leave the Commission in 1891,
but his early leadership of that body
provided significant guidance for the
national, independent administrative
agencies established in the decades to follow.
In 1893, the American Bar Association
graced itself by electing Cooley its
president. Over the course of the next
century, the Supreme Court of the United
States cited Cooleys writing frequently,
almost certainly more than those of any
other legal writer. But these later events
only underscored the eminence that Cooley

had already achieved by 1886, an eminence
that Harvard was bound to acknowledge.
The award, appropriate though it was,
caused a moment of tension. That tension
signified changes in the American legal
profession occurring at that moment.
Those present honored both the declining
agrarian-democratic aspirations or homely
pretensions of the nineteenth-century
American law represented by Cooley and
the rising technocratic aspirations or
pretensions of the profession most clearly
reflected in the emerging character of the
Harvard Law School.
The year 1886 was a time when the
resolution of the enduring conflict between
democracy and professionalism was being
re-ordered by the secondary and tertiary
effects of industrialization. The resolution
effected at that time seemingly fit the
needs, or at least the tastes, of an
industrializing society. The outcome was
academization, an ardent embrace by the
profession of academic credentials and the
idea of intellectual meritocracy.
When receiving his degree, Cooley
acknowledged this tension. He spoke
briefly at a dinner in Hemenway
Gymnasium, along with Justice [Oliver
Wendell] Holmes, then of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, and Dean
Langdell [Harvard Law School Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell]. With
appropriate modesty, Cooley saluted the
Harvard Law School as an institution that
had rendered great service to the nation
and promised greater service in the future.
But he spoke in terms unsettling to those
present:
[W]e fail to appreciate the dignity of our
profession if we look for it either in
profundity of learning or in forensic
triumphs. Its reason for being must be
found in the effective aid it renders to
justice and in the sense that it gives of
public security through its steady
support of public order. These are
commonplaces, but the strength of law
lies in its commonplace character; and it
becomes feeble and untrustworthy
when it expresses something different
from the common thoughts of men.
That utterance stated a guiding premise
of Cooleys career, a premise shaping the
conduct of his law school, the character of
his scholarship, his judicial behavior, his
public comments on the political issues of
his day, and his future leadership of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. That
premise was an axiom of American public
law to many of those who professed and
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practiced it in the half century preceding
1886. Nevertheless, its assertion at Harvard
almost surely offended his host,
Christopher Columbus Langdell, whose
novel case-method teaching had been
celebrated earlier that day and was on the
verge of becoming a standard of a new
professional class. In the hands of Langdell,
the case method was tht: emblem of a
technocratized profession, one committed
primarily to the conduct of private affairs
and the management of private relations
through the use of expert knowledge of
increasingly complex legal texts presumed
to be incomprehensible to laypersons.
Cooley's remark also struck Justice
Holmes with sufficient force that he was
moved to respond to Cooley on another
celebratory occasion at Northwestern
University in 1902, four years after
Cooleys death. On that occasion, Holmes
called forth "the lightning of genius" to
correct the failings of the "common
thoughts of men." In 1886, Holmes was
known to those present not only as a local
judge, but also as the author of The
Common Law. He was destined for elevation
to the Supreme Court of the United States,
but remained relatively obscure until his
canonization in the 1920s by some of the
leaders of the newly emerging legal
academy. Then he came to overshadow
Cooley and others as the most memorable
lawyer of his time and as the intellectual
patron of the newly emerging subprofession
of academic law, a subprofession that over
the following century drew its inspiration
less from its public responsibility and more
from its academic status.
Cooley spoke at Harvard not only as a
late Jacksonian, but also as an early
Progressive. His words not only were in
keeping with the antecedent tradition
established in the eighteenth century, but
also foretold many of the thoughts and
aspirations of a generation of twentiethcentury reformers who inherited his
professional morality. Thus, in the first half
of the twentieth century, Langdell's reforms
were in part appropriated by those sharing
Cooleys perception that the primary
mission of the legal profession is to provide
stewardship for the institutions of
democratic self-government. Cooleys
professional morality was perpetuated in
the careers of Progressive lawyers and
judges such as Louis Brandeis, Ernst
Freund, and learned Hand, and would
abide in the later careers of others such as
Byron White.
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